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Abstract 
 
National governments dislike food price volatility to varying extents. When some of them use 
trade measures to insulate their domestic market from international food price fluctuations, 
that volatility is amplified. This in turn prompts more countries to follow suit. However, 
when both food-exporting and food-importing countries so respond, each group becomes less 
capable of preventing domestic price volatility. This paper examines empirically the extent of 
insulation in both groups of countries, and also in high-income versus developing countries. 
It also provides an estimate of the contribution of such government actions to international 
food price spikes. A multilateral agreement to limit such government responses would reduce 
the need for all countries to so intervene, and allow more-efficient generic social protection 
policies to deal with the most vulnerable cases. 
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Government trade restrictions and 
international price volatility 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent upward spike in international food prices caused panic in numerous developing 
countries. It may have even contributed to the latest political revolutions in several Arab 
countries. Commodity price volatility is also undesirable because it reduces consumer and 
investor confidence in all countries, thereby potentially lowering global economic growth. It 
also causes swings in the economic welfare of net sellers of food versus net buying 
households, and hence also between net food-exporting and food-importing countries.  
Understanding the causes of international food price volatility is thus an important 
first step towards reducing this global problem. Much has been written and spoken about 
possible causes of the most-recent fluctuations in those prices, including in the mass media 
and in international fora such as the G20 (FAO et al. 2011). Weather is obviously one 
possible supply-side contender, and climate change may be adding to the frequency and 
severity of extreme weather events. However, since growing seasons vary across the globe, 
international trade and consumer substitutability normally can even out their effects on the 
international price of various foods. Speculators are sometimes blamed, although in fact their 
contribution is usually the opposite because they tend to buy when prices are high and sell 
when they are low. A problem can arise though if global stocks are depleted while prices are 
still rising – which Wright (2011) argues was one of the contributors to the 2008 food price 
spike.  
The purpose of this paper is to highlight another contributor to the volatility of 
international food markets, namely national governments’ agricultural trade policies. Those 
policies contribute in two ways: through ‘thinning’ the international market for food in 
normal years; and through ‘insulating’ domestic markets from, and thereby adding to, 
international price swings in abnormal years. Over the past half century the former has been a 
consequence of rich industrial countries protecting farmers relative to manufacturers and poor 
agrarian countries doing the opposite (for reasons explained in Anderson 1995 and 2010). 
2 
 
The latter is the result of fluctuations in food trade restrictions, stemming from the fact that 
national governments dislike food price volatility. When some governments alter the 
restrictiveness of their food trade measures to insulate their domestic markets from 
international price fluctuations, the volatility faced by other countries is amplified. That 
reaction therefore prompts more countries to follow suit, which not only further amplifies but 
also lengthens the duration of each price spike. The irony is, however, that when both food-
exporting and food-importing countries so respond, each country group undermines the 
other’s attempts to stabilize its domestic markets. That is, what seems like a solution to each 
country’s concern if it were acting alone turns out to be less effective, the more other 
countries respond in a similar way. 
This paper first explains the basic national and global economics behind both types of 
trade policy contributions to the volatility of international food prices. It then reviews 
empirical evidence on trends and fluctuations in the extent of those policy interventions, and 
the evolution through time of their market, welfare, inequality and poverty effects. It 
highlights the substantial role that trade restrictions continue to play in ‘thinning’ 
international food markets, and the roles that fluctuations in those trade restrictions have 
played in amplifying substantially international price volatility and yet reducing very little 
domestic food price volatility. The final section examines national and multilateral policy 
options for reducing the contribution of trade policies to global food price volatility, and for 
improving the effectiveness of social protection policies to deal with the most vulnerable 
households whose food security would otherwise be adversely affected by food price spikes.   
 
 
2. Global Economic Effects of National Trade Policies  
 
Consider first the ‘thinning’ argument. If rich industrial countries protect their farmers from 
import competition more than they assist their manufacturers and producers of other 
tradables, that policy choice encourages domestic food production and discourages domestic 
food consumption in those countries. It thus reduces demand and so lowers the relative price 
of food and reduces the volume traded in the international food marketplace. If poor agrarian 
countries do the opposite, for example through taxing farm exports or protecting 
manufacturers from import competition, that discourages domestic food production and 
encourages domestic food consumption in those developing countries. That in turn reduces 
supply and so further lowers the relative price of food and reduces the volume traded in the 
3 
 
international food marketplace. These two country groups’ trade policies thus reinforce each 
other’s impacts on that international market. (They also reinforce each other in discriminating 
against net sellers of farm products in developing countries – including in those countries 
whose governments choose not to adopt anti-agricultural trade policies.) The important point 
in terms of price volatility is that such a policy regime, through reducing the volume of food 
trade across national borders, ‘thins’ the international food market and thus makes its price 
more volatile in the face of any given-sized global supply or demand shock. This same 
impact on the price and volume of global trade applies if the two country groups are simply 
food importers and food exporters, rather than distinguished by per capita income.  
 Turning to the ‘insulating’ aspect of farm trade policies, it is again helpful to consider 
the same two country groups, food importers and food exporters. Suppose a severe weather 
shock at a time of low global stocks causes the international food price to suddenly rise. 
Those national governments wishing to avert losses for domestic food consumers may alter 
their food trade restriction so that only a fraction of that price rise is transmitted to their 
domestic market. For example, imposing or raising an export tax or an equivalent quantitative 
restriction on food exports would mean the domestic price in a food-surplus country would 
rise less than the border price. Similarly, lowering any import tax on food would mean the 
domestic price in a food-deficit country would rise less than the border price. Hence it is not 
surprising that governments, in seeking to protect domestic consumers from an upward spike 
in international food prices, consider a change in trade measures as an appropriate response. 
That response raises the consumer subsidy equivalent/lowers the consumer tax equivalent of 
any such trade measure, and does the opposite to producer incentives. Conversely, a global 
shock that expanded supply on the international food market and caused its price to slump 
may trigger the opposite reaction by governments concerned for the welfare of their farmers. 
That is, food export taxes may be lowered in food-surplus countries and tariffs may be raised 
in food-importing countries, again to ensure only a fraction of the change in the international 
price is transmitted to those countries’ domestic markets. In that scenario the response by 
governments lowers the producer tax equivalent/raises the producer subsidy equivalent of any 
such trade measure, and does the opposite to consumer incentives. 
 However, if such domestic market insulation using trade measures is practiced by 
large countries, or by a sufficiently large number of small countries, it turns out to be not very 
effective in keeping domestic price volatility below what it would be in the international 
marketplace if no government so responded. To see why this can lead to ineffective 
outcomes, it is helpful to refer to Figure 1, which depicts the international market of food. In 
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a normal year, the excess supply curve for the world’s food-exporting countries is ESo and 
the excess demand curve for the world’s food-importing countries is EDo. In the absence of 
any trade costs such as for transport, equilibrium in a normal year would be at Eo with Qo 
units traded at international price Po. 
{Figure 1 about here} 
An adverse season in some exporting countries at a time when global stocks are low 
would shift the excess supply curve leftwards to ES1. If there were no policy responses, the 
equilibrium would shift from Eo to E1; and the international price and quantity traded across 
national borders would change from Po and Qo to P1 and Q1. However, if the higher price 
prompts governments to alter their trade restrictiveness, there will be additional effects. On 
the one hand, suppose some of the food-exporting countries choose to impose or raise an 
export tax. That would move the excess supply curve further to the left, say to ES2. This 
would move the equilibrium to E2 and raise the international price further, to P2, but the 
domestic price in those export-restricting countries would be Px which is below P1. Such a 
reaction thus provides partial insulation in those exporting countries from the initial 
exogenous shock to the international market. Furthermore, their combined actions reduce 
aggregate exports to Q2 and cause the international terms of trade to turn further in their 
favor, because of the additional reduction in available supplies on the international market. 
That means, however, that food-importing countries face an even higher international price, 
at P2 instead of P1.  
 On the other hand, suppose some protective food-importing countries were to reduce 
their barriers to food imports in response to the international price rising from P0 to P1. That 
would shift the excess demand curve to the right, say to ED’. In that case the new equilibrium 
would be at E’, involving Q’ units traded at international price P’. That response would 
provide partial insulation in those food-importing countries from the initial exogenous shock 
to the international market: their domestic price would rise by only MN instead of by ME’ in 
Figure 1. However, the combined actions of those importing countries cause the international 
terms of trade to turn further against them.  
What if both country groups intervene, each seeking to at least offset the effect on 
their domestic price of the other country group’s policy response? In practice, the more one 
group seeks to insulate its domestic market, the more the other group is likely to respond. The 
example of such actions shown in Figure 1 involves the curves shifting simultaneously to ES2 
and ED’, in which case the international price is pushed even higher to P3 while the domestic 
price in each country group would be lower by E3E1. That is, in that particular case the 
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domestic price (and the quantity traded internationally, Q1) would be exactly the same as if 
neither country group’s governments had altered their trade restrictions. The terms of trade 
would now be even better for the food-exporting country group, and even worse for food-
importing countries. Aggregate global welfare would be the same as when neither country 
group so intervenes, but there would be an economic welfare transfer from food-importing to 
food-exporting countries, via the terms of trade change, equal to areas P1E1E3P3.   
Conversely, if the exogenous weather shock was of the opposite sort (a bumper 
harvest) which depressed the international price even after purchases by stockholders, and if 
governments sought in that case to protect their farmers from the full force of the price fall, 
the international price fall would be accentuated to the benefit of food-importing countries. 
Clearly, both such attempts at price insulation exacerbate international price volatility 
while doing little or possibly nothing to assist those most harmed by the initial exogenous 
weather shock.  
More than that, this use of trade measures can be inefficient and possibly inequitable, 
and it may even add to global poverty despite its motivation being to reduce the risk of a rise 
in national poverty. To see that in the case of an upward spike in the international price, note 
that an import tax is the equivalent of a consumer tax and a producer subsidy, hence lowering 
it also reduces the extent to which the measure assists producers of the product in question. 
Likewise, an export tax is the equivalent of a consumer subsidy and a producer tax, so raising 
it not only helps consumers but also harms farmers. If farming is discouraged, the demand for 
labor on farms falls, and with it the wages of unskilled workers not only in farm jobs but also 
in non-farm jobs – and more so the more agrarian is the economy. Thus while poor 
households may benefit on the expenditure side from a measure that reduces the extent to 
which the cost of food consumption would otherwise rise, they could be harmed on the 
earnings side if they are sellers of food or suppliers of unskilled labor. Such trade policy 
responses therefore could add to rather than reduce poverty (Ivanic and Martin 2008; Aksoy 
and Hoekman 2010). That could in turn add to food insecurity, since food security refers to 
not only national availability but also economic access to and effective utilization of food 
(Pinstrup-Andersen 2009; Barrett 2010). 
In the case of a small food-exporting country unable to influence its terms of trade, an 
increase in export restrictions is likely to reduce its national economic welfare, because such 
measures distort domestic production in addition to lowering the consumer price of food. 
Trade measures are wasteful too if it is only the poorest consumers who need to be helped, 
since a trade measure affects all food consumers in the country and in proportion to their 
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expenditure on food. In the case of opposite changes to trade measures, aimed at protecting 
farmers from a slump in international food prices, it is net buyers of food who are 
inadvertently harmed by such trade policy responses, and all food sellers rather than just the 
poorest are helped – and in proportion to their marketed output, thereby adding to farm 
income inequality.  
 
 
3. Empirical Evidence  
 
There is now a considerable body of evidence to suggest that national food trade policies are 
having a non-trivial impact in increasing the volatility of international food markets and, 
through that mechanism, adversely affecting global food security. This section provides a 
brief review of pertinent studies that collectively lead one to that conclusion. It begins with 
evidence showing that the global pattern of trade policies since the 1950s has ‘thinned’ 
international food markets and, even ignoring the impact of that on volatility, has contributed 
to global poverty and thereby global food insecurity. It then turns to evidence showing the 
extent to which countries’ trade policies ‘insulate’ their domestic food markets, the impact of 
that on international food prices, and hence the effectiveness of those national policies in 
preventing a rise in domestic food prices when international prices spike.  
 
3.1  How much have trade policies ‘thinned’ the international food market? 
 
Most countries have some forms of taxes or quantitative restrictions on imports of some 
products, and many developing countries have also taxed or quantitative restricted some of 
their exports. Less commonly, countries occasionally will subsidize exports or imports too. In 
addition, it was not uncommon before the 1990s for developing countries to operate multiple 
exchange rate regimes, which also had a strong anti-trade bias. And any domestic producer or 
consumer price subsidies or taxes on tradable products also alter volumes of trade. 
 For decades agricultural subsidies and protection from imports in high-income (and 
some middle-income) countries have been depressing international prices of farm products. 
The Haberler (1958) report to GATT Contracting Parties forewarned that such distortions 
might worsen, and indeed they did between the 1950s and the early 1980s in East Asia, North 
America and Western Europe (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986). Meanwhile, the 
governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past 
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half-century. A well-known example is the taxing of exports of plantation crops in post-
colonial Africa (Bates 2005). At the same time, many developing countries chose also to 
overvalue their currency, and to pursue an import-substituting industrialization strategy by 
restricting imports of manufactures. Together those latter measures indirectly taxed producers 
of other tradable products in developing economies, by far the most numerous of them being 
farmers (Krueger, Schiff and Valdés 1988, 1991). Thus the price incentives facing farmers in 
many developing countries have been depressed by both own-country and other countries’ 
agricultural price and international trade policies. 
This disarray in world agriculture, as Johnson (1973) described it in the title of his 
seminal book, means there has been over-production of farm products in high-income 
countries and under-production in low-income countries. It also means there has been less 
international trade in farm products than would be the case under free trade, thereby thinning 
markets for these weather-dependent products and thus making them more volatile. Using a 
model of world food markets as of 1990, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.9) found that 
high-income country pro-farm policies lowered international food prices by 20 percent, but 
that most of that was offset by developing countries’ anti-agricultural policies. They also 
found that high-income country policies lowered the volume of international food trade by 25 
percent. However, developing countries’ policies did likewise, and the combined effect was 
to shrink global food trade in 1990 by 56 percent – making it very much more susceptible to 
exogenous global supply or demand shocks.  
During the past 25 years, however, numerous countries have begun to reform their 
agricultural price and trade policies: since the latter 1980s high-income countries have 
steadily lowered their assistance to farmers and have decoupled some of that support from 
production, while developing countries have gradually lowered their farm export taxes and 
their import tariffs on manufactures. One effect is a convergence towards zero in the 
estimated nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to farmers, which is the percentage by which 
gross earnings from farming in each country exceed (or, if negative, fall short of) what they 
would in the absence of national agricultural price and trade policies (see Figure 2).  
Despite the comprehensiveness of those trade reforms, they have raised only very 
slightly the global extent to which farm products are traded internationally: the share of 
primary agricultural production exported globally, including intra-European Union trade, rose 
from 13 percent to just 16 percent in the two decades to 2000-04 (Sandri, Valenzuela and 
Anderson 2007). One reason for this small aggregate global response is that high-income 
countries lowered not only their import restrictions but also their export subsidies. A second 
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reason is that while developing countries phased out their farm export taxes, they also raised 
their tariffs on farm imports. As a result, international food markets are not much ‘thicker’ 
now than they were a quarter-century ago. 
According to global economy-wide modelling results reported in Valenzuela et al. 
(2009), however, liberalization of remaining trade barriers as of 2004 would raise the share of 
farm production exported globally by another four percentage points. Thus plenty of scope 
still remains to ‘thicken’ international food markets and thereby make them less volatile. 
Such liberalization also would lower global poverty, according to more-detailed modelling 
that draws on those global economy-wide model results (Anderson et al. 2010, 2011). Global 
food security would thus be boosted by both of those effects of further trade liberalization – 
even before taking into account the ‘insulating’ feature of current food trade policies, to 
which we now turn.  
{Figure 2 about here} 
 
3.2  How much have trade policies ‘insulated’ domestic food markets from international 
price volatility? 
 
The above empirical evidence focuses on trends in trade-distorting policies. Another feature 
of those food market interventions is that they are negatively correlated with international 
food price movements. NRAs fluctuate considerably around trend, and not only in extreme 
price spike periods. Figure 3 shows the extent of that negative correlation for the three key 
grains, even after averaging across as many as 82 countries. 
{Figure 3 about here} 
It is possible to estimate the proportion of any international price fluctuation that is 
transmitted to domestic markets within twelve months. It is also possible to obtain a crude 
back-of-the-envelope estimate how much trade policy responses exacerbate international 
price spikes. Anderson and Nelgen (2012a) have estimated a short-run elasticity of 
transmission of the international product price to the domestic market for the three key 
grains. Following Nerlove (1972) and Tyers and Anderson (1992, pp. 65-75), they use a 
partial-adjustment geometric distributed lag formulation to estimate elasticities for each 
product for all focus countries for the period 1985 to 2010. Specifically, they assume that 
associated with the border price pt
*
 there is a ‘target’ domestic price tp , towards which policy 
ensures that the actual domestic price, pt, moves only sluggishly. Changes in this target price 
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might respond incompletely, even in the long run, to corresponding changes in the border 
price. If all prices are expressed in logarithms, the target domestic price then has the 
following relationship with the border price:  
(1) )( *0
*
0 pppp tLRt             
where LR is the long-run price transmission elasticity and the values of p0 and 𝑝0
∗ are the 
domestic and border prices in the base period. In the short-run, the actual domestic price 
adjusts only partially each year to any change in the target domestic price:  
(2)      )( 11   tttt pppp         
where the parameter δ gives the fraction of the ultimate adjustment that takes place in one 
year. By substituting (1) into (2) to eliminate the unobservable target price, the following 
reduced form, which is suitable for fitting to data, is obtained:  
(3)      *1
*
00 )1()( tLRtLRt ppppp     =   a + b pt-1 + c 𝑝𝑡
∗         
where, again, if the current US dollar prices are expressed in logarithms, the short-run (one-
year) elasticity of price transmission, call it ϕSR , is simply δ times the long-run elasticity. 
Thus the estimate of the short-run elasticity is the regression coefficient c and the long-run 
elasticity estimate is c/(1-b).  
Table 1 summarizes the estimates. The average of estimates for the short-run 
transmission elasticity over the 25 years to 2010 ranges from 0.73 for soybean down to just 
0.43 for sugar. The unweighted average across these ten key farm products is 0.56, 
suggesting that within one year, barely half the movement in international prices of farm 
products is transmitted domestically on average. These estimates are consistent with a recent 
study by Minot (2011) of 11 Sub-Saharan African countries. Despite using a somewhat 
different methodology, he estimated short-run price transmission elasticities for key staple 
foods that averaged 0.63. Earlier multicountry studies by Comforti (2004) and Tyers and 
Anderson (1992, Appendix 2) generally got short-run estimates below 0.5.  
{Table 1 about here} 
Using their stochastic model of world food markets and their estimated price 
transmission elasticities (based on price data from the previous 25 years), Tyers and 
Anderson (1992, pp. 227-8) ran 200 repeated simulations with random weather shocks. They 
found that the coefficient of variation of international food prices would fall from 34 to 10 
percent if all countries agreed in 1990 to cease their domestic price-insulating practices and 
instead maintain constant ad valorem trade tax rates. In most of the 16 developing economies 
they considered, the coefficient of variation for domestic prices (the standard deviation 
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divided by the mean) would fall substantially if all countries refrained from using the type of 
price insulating prices they had used in the past quarter-century. In a number of these cases, 
such as Bangladesh, Thailand and South Africa, the reductions in domestic price instability 
were estimated to be dramatic, with the coefficient of variation in Bangladesh, for instance, 
falling from 26 to 8 percent. In the few cases where the coefficient of variation of domestic 
prices was estimated to rise, the increases were much smaller. Given that the extent to which 
variations in trade barriers are used to insulate domestic food markets from international food 
price volatility appears to have been no less in the past 25 years than in the generation prior to 
1990, the coefficient of variation of international food prices could well fall by one-third if all 
countries agreed today to cease their domestic price-insulating practices. And recall that this 
is additional to the contribution that trade liberalization could make to reducing international 
food price volatility through ‘thickening’ international food markets (discussed above in the 
section 3.1). 
 
3.3  How much do trade policy responses exacerbate international price spikes? 
 
With the help of some simplifying assumptions, it is possible to estimate without a complex 
stochastic simulation model the extent to which government trade policy reactions contribute 
to an international price spike such as in 2008 or in 1974 for individual commodities. Martin 
and Anderson (2012) point out that this can be done by assuming a homogenous product 
whose global market equilibrium condition, assuming perfect competition and zero trade 
costs, is:  
(4) Σi (Si(pi)+vi)  -  ΣiDi(pi) = 0 
where Si is the supply in country i; pi is the country’s domestic price; vi is a random weather-
related exogenous production shift variable for that country; and Di is demand in country i 
(assumed to be not subject to shocks from year to year). Assume further that border measures 
are the only price-distorting policy intervention to be used, in which case we can define a 
single variable for the power of the trade tax equivalent, Ti = (1+ti) where ti is country i’s rate 
of tax on trade.    
Totally differentiating equation (4), rearranging it, and expressing the results in 
percentage change form yields the following expression for the impact of a set of changes in 
trade distortions on the international price p
*
, assuming the policy changes are independent of 
the exogenous supply shocks: 
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(5)  p̂*= 
∑ Hivî i +  ∑ (Hiγi- Giηi ).T̂ii
 
∑ (Giηi
- Hiγi )i    
        
where p̂∗  is the proportional change in the international price; 𝑣𝑖 ̂ is an exogenous stochastic 
shock to output such as might result from above or below average weather; ηi is the price 
elasticity of demand; γi is the price elasticity of supply; Gi is the share, at the international 
price, of country i in global demand; and Hi is the share of country i in global production. 
That is, the impact on the international price of a change in trade distortions by country i 
depends on the importance of that country in global demand and supply (Gi and Hi), as well 
as the responsiveness of its production and consumption to price changes in the country (as 
represented by γi and ηi).  
If it is assumed that output cannot respond in the short run, and that inventory levels 
are low enough that stock adjustments have limited effect (as is typically the case in a price 
spike period – see Wright 2011), then γi=0. If one further assumes that the national elasticities 
of final demand for the product (ηi) are the same across countries, then equation (5) reduces 
to: 
(6) − ∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑖 𝑇 ̂𝑖 = 𝑇 ̂ 
which is just the negative of the consumption-weighted global average of the sTi '
ˆ , call it 𝑇 ̂.  
 However, if the changes in trade restrictiveness are not independent of the exogenous 
supply (or any other) shocks, then  
(7) p̂∗ =  𝑇 ̂ +  𝑅 + (𝑇 ̂ ∗  𝑅),  
from which it follows that R =  (p̂∗ – 𝑇 ̂)/(1 + 𝑇 ̂), where R refers to the rest of the influences 
on p*. In that case, and if the interaction term is distributed proportionately, the contribution 
of the changes in trade restrictiveness to the international price change, in proportional terms, 
is 
𝑇 ̂
𝑇 ̂+ 𝑅
. 
Estimates of those indicators are summarized for the key grains in Table 2. For rice,   
-𝑇 ̂ (the cumulative proportional decline in the Nominal Assistance Coefficient, where NAC 
= 1+NRA/100) is shown in the first row of Table 2 to be 0.37 between 2006 and 2008. The 
comparable numbers for wheat and maize are 0.12 and 0.08, respectively. According to 
World Bank (2012) data, the international price of rice increased by 113 percent between 
2006 and 2008, and the prices of wheat and maize by 70 and 83 percent, respectively (middle 
rows of Table 2). Thus these estimates suggest that altered trade restrictions during the 2006-
08 period caused international prices to be higher by 0.40 for rice, 0.19 for wheat, and 0.10 
for maize (bottom third of Table 2). The unweighted average of these three, at 0.23, is the 
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same as for 1972-74 (first column of Table 2), although the price spikes were somewhat 
larger then.  
{Table 2 about here} 
It is possible to apportion those policy contributions between country groups. Table 3 
reports the contributions of high-income versus developing countries, and also of exporting 
versus importing countries. During 2006-08, developing countries were responsible for the 
majority of the policy contribution to all three grains’ price spikes, whereas in 1972-74 the 
opposite was the case except for rice. As for exporters versus importers, it appears exporters’ 
policies had the majority of the influence, other than for wheat in the 1970s, but importers 
made a very sizeable contribution as well.  
{Table 3 about here} 
In the light of these estimates, how effective were changes in trade restrictions in 
limiting the rise in domestic prices? The proportional rise in the international price net of the 
contribution of changed trade restrictions is R/(𝑇 ̂+ R). That fraction, when multiplied by the 
international price rise shown in the middle part of Table 2, is reported in the second column 
of Table 4, where it is compared with the proportional rises in the domestic price in our 
sample of countries. The numbers for 2006-08 suggest that, on average for all countries in the 
sample, domestic prices rose slightly more than the adjusted international price change for 
wheat, and only slightly less for maize and just one-sixth less for rice. The extent of 
insulation was greater in developing countries, especially for wheat and maize, which is 
consistent with the finding from the middle columns of Table 3 that their policymakers 
contributed more to the price spike than governments of high-income countries. This recent 
experience contrasts with the early 1970s, when high-income countries were much more 
insulated than recently. These results suggests that the combined responses by governments 
of all countries have been sufficiently offsetting as to do very little to insulate domestic 
markets from this recent international food price spike. 
{Table 4 about here} 
 
 
4. Policy Implications  
 
The above estimates support the a priori reasoning in Section 2 that national trade restrictions 
add non-trivially to international food price volatility in at least two ways: through ‘thinning’ 
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international food markets, and through ‘insulating’ domestic food markets from international 
price fluctuations. Together those policy attributes magnify the effect on international prices 
of any shock to global food supply or demand. 
 The solution to the first (‘thinning’) problem is simple economically if not politically: 
it is for countries to open further their markets to food trade. The political difficulty and the 
adjustment costs associated with doing that are minimized if countries can agree to liberalize 
their food and agricultural markets multilaterally, and to do so at the same time as non-
agricultural markets are liberalized. That was what happened in the Uruguay Round, and it is 
what has been aspired to by members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) via their Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). After more than a decade of negotiating, the DDA has come to 
a standstill, but there is still hope that the talks will be revived. Meanwhile, various 
plurilateral negotiations on options for regional integration and free-trade areas are under 
discussion, but the benefits from them are always far smaller than those from a multilateral 
agreement and often agriculture is the sector liberalized least (Anderson 2013). 
 The optimal solution to the second (‘insulating’) problem also involves the WTO. In a 
many-country world, it is clear from the above analysis that the trade policy actions of 
individual countries can be offset by those of other countries to the point that the 
interventions become ineffective in achieving their stated aim of reducing domestic food 
price volatility. This is a classic international public good problem that could be solved by a 
multilateral agreement to restrain the use of variable export restrictions.  
One of the original motivations for the Contracting Parties to sign the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, WTO’s predecessor) was to bring stability and 
predictability to world trade. To that end the membership has adopted rules to encourage the 
use of trade taxes in place of quantitative restrictions on trade (Article IX of the GATT), and 
has managed to obtain binding commitments on import tariffs and on production and export 
subsidies as part of the GATT’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. However, those 
bindings continue to be set well above applied rates by most countries, leaving plenty of 
scope for varying import restrictions without dishonoring those legal commitments under 
WTO. Meanwhile, there are no effective disciplines on export taxes, let alone bindings. 
In the current Doha round of WTO negotiations there are proposals to phase out 
agricultural export subsidies as well as to bring down import tariff bindings, both of which 
would contribute to global economic welfare, the ‘thickening’ of food and agricultural 
markets, and thereby more-stable international food prices. However, proposals to broaden 
the Doha agenda to also introduce disciplines on export restraints have struggled to date to 
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gain traction. A proposal by Japan in 2000, for example, involved disciplines similar to those 
on the import side, with export restrictions to be replaced by taxes and export taxes to be 
bound and gradually phased down. A year later Jordan proposed even stronger rules: a ban on 
export restrictions and, as proposed for export subsidies, the binding of all export taxes at 
zero. However, strong opposition to the inclusion of this export item on the Doha 
Development Agenda has come from several food-exporting developing countries, led by 
Argentina (whose farm exports have been highly taxed since its large currency devaluation at 
the end of 2001). This reflects the facts that traditionally the demandeurs in WTO 
negotiations have been dominated by interests seeking market access, and that upward price 
spikes are infrequent. Yet the above analysis reveals the need for symmetry of treatment of 
export and import disciplines in the WTO. 
Moreover, developing countries have added to the WTO’s Doha Agenda a proposal 
for a Special Safeguards Mechanism (SSM) that would allow those countries to raise their 
agricultural import barriers above their bindings for a significant proportion of farm products 
in the event of a sudden international price fall or an import surge. This is the exact opposite 
of what is needed by way of an international public good to reduce the frequency and 
amplitude of downward food price spikes (Hertel, Martin and Leister 2010). Evidence 
provided by Anderson and Nelgen (2012a) for the mid-1980s suggests that if food-importing 
countries were to exercise that proposed freedom when international prices slump, food-
surplus countries would respond by lowering their export restrictions – thereby weakening 
the efforts of the food-importing countries to insulate their domestic markets from the 
international price fall – and further depressing that price. 
If WTO member countries were to liberalize their food trade and bind their trade taxes 
at low or zero levels, and assuming there would still be occasions when international food 
prices spike, what alternative instruments could they use to avert losses for significant groups 
in their societies? A standard answer from economists is that food security for consumers, 
most notably food affordability for the poor, is best dealt with using generic social safety net 
measures that offset the adverse impacts of a wide range of different shocks on poor people – 
net sellers as well as net buyers of food – without imposing the costly by-product distortions 
that necessarily accompany the use of n
th
-best trade policy instruments for social protection. 
That might take the form of targeted income supplements to only the most vulnerable 
households, and only while the price spike lasts. This standard answer has far greater power 
now than just a few years ago, thanks to the digital information and communication 
technology (ICT) revolution. In the past it has often been claimed that such payments are 
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unaffordable in poor countries. However, recall that in half the cases considered above, 
governments reduce their trade taxes, so even that intervention is a drain on the finance 
ministry’s budget in those cases. Moreover, the ICT revolution has made it possible for 
conditional cash transfers to be provided electronically as direct assistance to even remote 
and small households, and even to the most vulnerable members of those households 
(typically women and their young children – see, e.g., Fiszbein and Schady (2009), Adato 
and Hoddinott (2010) and Skoufias, Tiwari and Zaman (2010)). 
 Now is the time to move away from traditional national government trade policy 
reactions to food price spikes not only because, collectively, they are not very effective in 
stabilizing domestic prices, but also because they add to international price volatility by 
reducing the role that trade between nations can play in bringing stability to the world’s food 
markets. That adverse aspect will become ever more important as climate change increases 
the frequency and severity of extreme weather events – and if current biofuel policy 
responses to it continue to strengthen the link between food and volatile fossil fuel markets, 
as Hertel and Beckman (2011) suggest is distinctly possible.  
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Figure 1: Effects of offsetting export barrier increases and import barrier reductions in the 
international market for food in response to an exogenous supply shock from ES0 to ES1 
 
 
Source: Author’s depiction 
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to farmers (NRA)
a
, high-income and developing 
countries, 1955 to 2010 
 
 (percent)  
 
a
 The percentage by which gross earnings from farming in each country exceed what they 
would in the absence of national agricultural price and trade policies. The weighted average 
across products within countries, and across countries, is obtained using the value of 
agricultural production at undistorted prices as weights. 
 
Source: Updated from Anderson (2009), drawing on estimates in Anderson and Nelgen 
(2012b). 
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Figure 3: Grain NRAs and their international price, 82 countries,
a
 1970 to 2011 
(left axis is international price in current US$, right axis is weighted average NRA in percent) 
 
(a) Rice 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Wheat 
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Figure 3 (continued): Grain NRAs and their international price,
a
 82 countries, 1970 to 2011 
(left axis is international price in current US$, right axis is weighted average NRA in percent) 
 
(c) Maize 
 
 
 
 
a
 The NRA is a weighted average of the nominal rate of assistance to producers in each 
country, using production valued at undistorted prices as weights. The international prices are 
from World Bank (2011). Coefficients of correlation between the price and NRA are -0.76 
for rice, -0.32 for wheat and -0.45 for maize. 
 
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2012b).   
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Table 1: Global average short-run price transmission elasticities,
a
 key foods, 1985 to 2010 
(weighted average across all of the 82 countries for which NRAs are available, 
 using value of national production at undistorted prices as weights) 
 
Rice 0.49 
Wheat 0.55 
Maize 0.63 
Soybean 0.73 
Sugar 0.43 
Cotton 0.57 
Milk 0.51 
Beef 0.66 
Pigmeat 0.51 
Poultry 0.68 
Unweighted average, 
10 products 0.56 
 
 
a
 The proportion of a change in the international price that is transmitted to the domestic 
market of a country within a year, estimated using equation (3) in the text.  
 
Source: Estimated by Nelgen (2012) using equation (3) and data from Anderson and Nelgen 
(2012b). 
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Table 2: Contributions of policy-induced trade barrier changes to changes in the international 
prices of key agricultural products, 1972-74 and 2006-08 
 
 1972-74  2006-08 
Consumption-weighted proportional decline in NAC, that is,- 𝑇 ̂a  
Rice 0.56  0.37 
Wheat 0.30  0.12 
Maize 0.21  0.08 
 
Proportional international price rise, p̂∗  
Rice 3.00  1.13 
Wheat 1.57  0.70 
Maize 1.35  0.83 
 
Proportional contribution of changed trade restrictions to the international    
price change
 b 
Rice 0.27  0.40 
Wheat 0.23  0.19 
Maize 0.18  0.10 
 
a
 𝑇 ̂ is the negative of the weighted average of proportional changes in national NACs over 
the period, using national shares of global consumption valued at undistorted prices (Gi’s) as 
weights, where NAC = 1+NRA/100.  
 
b 
The proportional contribution of altered trade restrictions is  
𝑇 ̂
𝑇 ̂+ 𝑅
, where R is ‘other’ 
influences and is derived from the equation p̂∗ =  𝑇 ̂ +  𝑅 + (𝑇 ̂ ∗  𝑅), from which it follows 
that R =  (p̂∗ - 𝑇 ̂)/(1 + 𝑇 ̂).  
 
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2012a). 
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Table 3: Contributions
a
 of high-income and developing countries, and of importing and 
exporting countries, to the proportion of the international price change that is due to policy-
induced trade barrier changes, 1972-74 and 2006-08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1972-74 
TOTAL 
PROPORTIONAL 
CONTRIBUTION 
High-income 
countries’ 
contribution 
Developing 
countries’ 
contribution  
Importing 
countries’ 
contribution 
Exporting 
countries’ 
contribution 
Rice 0.27 0.04 0.23 0.10 0.17 
Wheat 0.23 0.15 0.08 0.18 0.05 
Maize 0.18 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.12 
 
2006-08 
     
Rice 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.18 0.22 
Wheat 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.12 
Maize 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 
 
 
a
 Expressed such that the two numbers in each subsequent pair of columns add to the total 
proportion shown in column 1 of each row. 
 
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2012a), with the left column coming from bottom one-third of 
Table 2. 
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Table 4: Comparison of the domestic price rise with the rise in international grain prices net 
of the contribution of changed trade restrictions, rice, wheat and maize, 1972-74 and 2006-08 
 
(percent, unweighted averages) 
 
 
 International price rise Domestic price rise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1972-74 
Including 
contribution of 
changed trade 
restrictions 
 
 
Net of  
contribution of 
changed trade 
restrictions 
 
All 
countries 
Developing 
countries 
High-
income 
countries 
Rice 300 220 59 72 27 
Wheat 157 121 64 77 55 
Maize 135 111 49 48 52 
 
2006-08 
     
Rice 113 68 56 48 74 
Wheat 70 56 77 65 81 
Maize 83 75 73 62 82 
 
 
Source: Anderson and Nelgen (2012a) 
 
 
 
